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The competition for mobile resources is a greater or lesser issue facing every
government. The economic analysis of the implications of such competition goes
back at least a half-century to work such as Tiebout (1956) and Stigler (1957),
and for the past decade or so this topic has been the subject of a rapidly-growing
and now very rich literature. The development of analytical models to address
tax competition traces its roots to the 1970s literature on the incidence of local
property taxation in the US, exempliﬁed by Mieszkowski (1972) (see also Zodrow
(2001)). Models in this tradition view the local property tax as a source-based
tax on capital used by small governments (i.e., governments situated within
a larger economy with highly integrated capital markets) that have no other
own-source revenue instruments at their disposal with which to ﬁnance the
provision of public goods – an analytical framework which, naturally, tends to
emphasize the connection between competition for mobile capital and the level
of provision of local public goods. Analyses in the Tiebout-Stigler-Oates (1969)
tradition follow the classical short-run/long-run distinction which views labor
or population as variable or mobile in the short-run while capital – e.g., in Oates
(1969), the stock of residential housing (treated as an asset whose capitalized
value reﬂects the impact of ﬁscal variables) – is variable in the long run, and
analyses in the Mieszkowski tradition would thus normally be viewed as models
of the long-run eﬀects of property taxation. Studies such as Hamilton (1975)
and Fischel (2001) emphasize the potential importance of regulatory constraints
(speciﬁcally, land-use controls) as instruments that link capital and population
movements, so that local property taxes become, implicitly, a form of entry fee
for households that wish to reside in a given locality.
As these brief remarks indicate, the modeling traditions in the literature of
ﬁscal competition owe a lot to the particular policy and institutional context of
local government ﬁnance in the US. This is noteworthy given that a signiﬁcant
part of the recent interest in ﬁscal competition seems to stem from concerns with
competition for capital, by national governments, at the international level. Not
infrequently, and in parallel with earlier analyses of local government property
taxation, this literature also assumes that a source-based capital tax – usually
interpreted in this context as a national-level corporation income tax – is the sole
source of revenue at the disposal of the (national) government. In an inversion
of the usual short-run/long-run distinction, many studies in this vein assume
that capital is freely mobile while labor is ﬁxed or immobile.
It goes without saying that a wide variety of speciﬁc modeling approaches can
be found in the literature1, and thus, the above characterization is oversimpli-
ﬁed. In general, however, it is fair to say that the mobility of households has
generally received relatively little attention in the context of international ﬁs-
cal competition. In this paper, I wish to draw attention to this comparatively
1Already, the body of survey articles and book-length treatments of the subject is growing
to substantial size: see, e.g., Wildasin (1986, 1998), Wellisch (2000), Wilson (1999), Wilson
and Wildasin (2004), Brueckner (2001), and Hauﬂer (2001) for surveys, syntheses, and many
citations to additional literature. See also a special issue of the Journal of Public Economic
Theory on this topic from April, 2003.
1neglected area of study, identifying some of the reasons why international labor
mobility – as well as international capital mobility – is of great importance both
for public policy and for economic analysis in general.
A principle theme of the paper is that the the public-ﬁnance implications of
labor and capital mobility depend critically on the spatial and temporal dimen-
sions of factor markets, that is, the deﬁnition of these markets both in space and
time. The ﬂow of production in an economy depends on ﬂows of inputs, notably
labor and capital services. These ﬂows derive from stocks of labor and capital
(and from the utilization of these stocks). The movement of capital and labor
across national boundaries are ﬂows that result in changes in capital and labor
stocks, and thus aﬀect the evolution of the economy over time. The adjustment
of these stocks is costly and thus occurs gradually: the movement of factors of
production across space is part of an adjustment of stocks through time. An
obvious consequence of these observations is that the spatial linkages between
factor markets – the degree of “integration” of factor markets – depends on
the time horizon over which labor and capital ﬂows occur. Finding an opera-
tional deﬁnition of the “size” of a factor market presents a formidable analytical
challenge, not unlike the familiar problem in industrial organization of deﬁning
the size of a market for a good or service, one that deserves considerably more
attention than it has received so far.
The integration of international capital markets has been discussed and ana-
lyzed extensively in recent years (many of the studies cited in n. 1 above focus
on capital markets), but integration of labor markets on an international scale is
somewhat less frequently discussed. To help motivate interest in labor mobility
in addition to capital mobility, Section 2 reviews some basic facts about mi-
gration among and within developed countries, and between less-developed and
advanced economies. It also highlights the fundamental importance of popula-
tion mobility for public ﬁnance. Section 3 then turns to the problem of “factor
market integration” more generally and some of the modeling challenges that it
presents. Section 4 concludes with a review of some major policy issues in which
labor or capital mobility play an especially important role. A short appendix
comments on the disparate modeling traditions that have arisen in the ﬁelds
of international and public economics – traditions that arise from a historical
context in which international factor mobility was frequently perceived to be
relatively inconsequential.
2 Migration and Fiscal Policy: Some Background
2.1 The Growing Importance of International Migration
The issue of immigration has become a highly sensitive one in a number of
advanced economies in recent years, and it might therefore seem obvious that
“migration” is an economically important phenomenon. Political debates can
easily become detached from reality, however, so a brief review of some basic
data on migration will be useful as a backdrop to the following discussion.
2To begin with, Table 1 presents some data on international migration ﬂows for
a selection of OECD countries. The table shows annual migration rates, i.e.,
population inﬂows and outﬂows expressed as a percentage of total population. In
addition, it shows gross migration rates, that is, the sum of inﬂows and outﬂows
as a percentage of total population, and the ratio of gross to net migration. Note
that gross migration rates exceed net migration rates, commonly by a factor of 2
or 3. Although net migration is positive for virtually every country in every year,
these net inﬂows are residuals obtained after subtracting outﬂows of signiﬁcant
magnitude. For several EU countries, gross migration rates in 2000 exceeded 1%
of total population: Austria, Belgium, and Germany all fall into this category.
Most other EU countries show gross migration rates between 0.5 and 1%. The
importance of gross migration rates for ﬁscal policy is discussed further below.
Tables 2 and 3 show the shares of foreign-born and foreign population for a
number of OECD countries. In contrast to Table 1, these are “stock” rather
than “ﬂow” data. Note that “foreign” population (Table 3) represents people
residing in a country who are not citizens there; typically, these will be foreign-
born people (Table 2) but in some countries nativity does not necessarily confer
citizenship (Switzerland, for example) and thus there can be “native foreigners.”
More importantly, it is possible for a country to reduce its “foreign” popula-
tion by awarding citizenship to foreign residents. Many EU countries maintain
population records based on citizenship status and do not track the size of the
foreign-born population, whereas the opposite is true from some other countries
(the US, Australia) – a fact that must be borne in mind in making international
comparisons. The fact that these oﬃcially-reported data typically omit illegal
immigrants, and thus systematically underestimate the importance of immigra-
tion, must also be kept in mind. It is of course impossible to measure illegal
immigration accurately but US data (see further discussion below) suggests that
illegal immigrants have accounted for around one-fourth of total immigration
ﬂows during the past decade, and one might plausibly assume that the same is
true for EU countries experiencing high levels of immigration.
As Tables 2 and 3 show, the proportion of foreign-born and foreign residents
in OECD countries varies widely. Among European countries that report the
relevant data, the foreign-born account for approximately 10% of the total pop-
ulation in Austria, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden, that is, about the
same share as in the US. A comparison of the ﬁgures in Tables 2 and 3, where
possible, shows the importance of the foreign/foreign-born distinction: the share
of foreigners in France, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden is less than two-
thirds of the share of foreign-born. Thus, Belgium and Germany, with foreign
populations of about 9%, stand out in Table 3, but the lower share of foreign
populations in other relatively high-income EU countries reﬂects diﬀerences in
naturalization policies as much as diﬀerences in the numbers of foreign-born
migrants. In short, immigrants are an important presence in OECD countries
today.
Their importance, demographically speaking, is almost certain to grow substan-
tially in the coming decades, barring major catastrophes like war, epidemic, or
economic depression. First, since immigrants are generally younger than native
3populations, the latter are disproportionately represented in high-mortality pop-
ulation age groups. Even if immigration were halted immediately, the foreign-
born share of the population would continue to rise for a considerable period of
time in any country that has experienced signiﬁcant immigration ﬂows in the
recent past. Second, as is well known, fertility rates have dropped dramatically
in many EU countries. Table 4 shows total fertility rates for selected OECD
countries. Many of these countries have fertility rates far below the 2.1 replace-
ment rate that would allow a population to sustain itself in the long run. Annual
net immigration ﬂows have exceeded annual births for the EU countries in ag-
gregate (excluding Greece and Portugal) for approximately the past 15 years,
making immigration the principal source of population growth for many coun-
tries. Third, the fertility behavior of recent immigrants tends to converge to
that of native residents with a lag. Recent immigrants to high-income countries
thus generally have fertility rates that are high by local standards, implying
that the future demographic impact of immigration is relatively large. Like
many demographic factors, all of these trends show a high degree of persistence
over time, insuring that the demographic and other impacts of international
immigration will be of increasing importance for many years to come.
2.2 Internal Migration
The distinction between international migration and migration within countries
is a familiar one, and one that is important from many perspectives. As an
economic process, however, the two share many fundamental characteristics. In
particular, both international and internal migration represent actions taken by
people who hope to improve their well-being, whether through the attainment
of higher incomes or otherwise. International and internal migration can both
be expected to aﬀect the supply of labor and, thus, labor market conditions,
in origin and destination regions. And both forms of migration have ﬁscal
consequences for relevant jurisdictions, national or subnational as the case may
be. Comparisons of internal and international migration are thus potentially
instructive.
Tables 5 and 6 present data on internal migration within the US and Canada,
respectively. The US data are displayed for four major Census regions, each of
roughly similar size and thus somewhat larger than but similar in population to
the larger EU countries; internal migration rates for smaller geographic units,
such as states, are of course larger than for these large Census regions. The
Canadian data in Table 6 are shown at the provincial level, which are quite
disparate in population and geographic size.
Observe, ﬁrst, that internal migration is a persistent characteristic of the US
economy. The data shown in Table 5, showing inﬂows and outﬂows from all four
regions over a period of 30 years, are quite typical of US experience throughout
the entire postwar period, as revealed in annual Census data. This suggests, on
the one hand, that there are no severe impediments to labor mobility within
the US, and, on the other hand, that population movements are a feature of the
dynamic equilibrium of the US economy, showing no tendency to disappear over
4time. Second, note that every region, in every year, experiences both inﬂows
and outﬂows of population, and that net migration, the diﬀerence between the
two, is generally rather modest in magnitude by comparison: gross migration
rates are frequently an order of magnitude greater than net rates.
Table 6 reveals a broadly similar picture for Canada for 1996: every province
experiences non-trivial population inﬂows in every year. Compared to other
provinces, Ontario and Quebec, the two largest provinces, stand out: the rates
of inﬂow from other provinces are notably smaller, and the rates of intraprovin-
cial migration are correspondingly larger, for these two provinces. This is a
reﬂection of the fact that each of these provinces is large both geographically
and in terms of population, each containing about one quarter of the national
population. The interprovincial migration rates for Canada are similar in mag-
nitude to the migration rates for US regions. Although the table does not
display interprovincial outﬂows, the fact that every province experiences sig-
niﬁcant inward interprovincial migration means that gross migration rates are
substantially larger than net migration rates in Canada, as in the US and as
was seen previously for international migration rates.
Comparing these data with Table 1, we see that rates of international migration
for OECD countries tend to be smaller than the internal migration rates for
the US and Canada shown in Tables 5 and 6. Since nations do not allow un-
restricted immigration or movement across boundaries, it is not surprising that
international migration rates are generally lower than is the case for internal
migration in the US and Canada. Tables 4 and 5 also shows that diﬀerential
between gross and net migration rates is substantially higher for internal mi-
gration in the US and Canada than is true for the international migration data
shown in Table 1.
2.3 Migration and Redistributive Policy
The discussion so far has outlined some basic facts about international and
internal migration. One way to assess the empirical importance of migration,
whether internal or international, is by use of the “head count metric”, i.e., by
simple counting of the number of migrants. A lesson to draw from the above
comparison of gross and net migration ﬂows is that the former generally exceed
the latter by a substantial margin. Just as gross rather than net trade ﬂows are
used to assess the degree of “openness” of an economy to trade, gross rather
than net migration ﬂows are better indicators of the openness of a national or
regional labor market.2 By this metric, changes in international migration ﬂows
over time indicate that competition for mobile labor is increasing on a global
2As discussed further in the next section, gross ﬂows, whether of goods and services or
of factors of production, understate the degree of openness or integration of markets. As
is well known, the magnitude of trade or factor ﬂows between regions depends not only
upon the absence of impediments to such ﬂows, but upon incentives for such ﬂows to occur.
These incentives – and the gains from exchange – typically arise from diﬀerences in tastes,
technologies, and endowments. Large and persistent gross interregional ﬂows of labor in the
highly integrated economies of North America provides evidence that incentives for spatial
reallocation of resources are continuously regenerated in dynamic economies.
5scale.
Despite its natural appeal, however, simple “head count” assessments of migra-
tion are seriously deﬁcient as stand-alone measures of the policy impact of actual
or potential migration. In particular, from a public ﬁnance perspective, migra-
tion matters not because of the raw numbers of migrants, but because of their
impacts on the ﬁscal systems of origin and destination nations and subnational
governments. As has been made clear from the long tradition of research on
local public ﬁnance mentioned in the introduction, demographic shifts can have
substantial eﬀects both on the revenue and on the expenditure sides of ﬁscal
accounts. A concise overview of the outlines of modern ﬁscal systems provides
a basis for assessing the public ﬁnance implications of household mobility.
Note ﬁrst that national governments – such as the governments of OECD na-
tions, as shown in Table 7 – typically derive the bulk of their revenues from
personal income taxation, payroll taxation, and, in Europe, the taxation of
consumption through value-added taxes. For the most part, each of these is a
residence-based tax – one that households pay if they reside within a country
and do not pay if they do not reside there. These taxes raise much more revenue
than corporation income taxes or other source-based taxes on capital income,
which typically account for around 10% of total taxes. Unlike local governments
in the United States, the ﬁscal systems of national governments are not very
well characterized as systems that, to a ﬁrst approximation, depend solely on
source-based capital taxation for tax revenues; on the contrary, the taxation of
households – their earnings, consumption, and non-wage income – accounts for
the bulk of public-sector revenues.
On the expenditure side, a portion of public expenditures on the provision of
public services and subsidies is directed toward the business sector and thus
could be interpreted as source-based public expenditures that raise the return
to capital investment. As Table 8 shows, however, a very large share of public
expenditure is devoted to cash and in-kind transfers to households, including
public pension expenditures, social welfare expenditures directed toward the
poor, and subsidization of health care expenditures. Based on these data, a
natural ﬁrst approximation of the ﬁscal systems of advanced economies would
be one that characterizes them mainly as redistributive mechanisms, taking
resources from some people and transferring them to others.3
For these reasons, the movement of households across national boundaries, when
it occurs, is fraught with importance for the ﬁscal systems of these countries.
When new residents arrive in a country, they receive incomes there and they
engage in consumption. In modern economies, a very substantial share of the
incomes that these residents receive accrues, on average, to the rest of the soci-
ety in the form of tax revenues, and a very substantial share of the consumption
3Of course, as is well known, the compulsory redistribution of resources among households
can be viewed as the ex post implementation of an ex ante social insurance contract. See, e.g.,
Harsanyi (1955), Varian (1980), and many others. Sinn (1995, 1996, 1997), Wildasin (1995,
2000b), and Wildasin and Wilson (1998), inter alia, discuss the importance of labor mobility
for diﬀerent aspects of social risk management. By aﬀecting the allocation of risks, especially
in instances where private markets are incomplete or imperfect, these “redistributive” policies
may thus aﬀect the eﬃciency of resource allocation.
6that they undertake is ﬁnanced by the rest of society in the form of public ex-
penditures. The departure of existing residents has the same eﬀects, in reverse.
For any individual household, the balance between tax contributions and public
expenditure burdens depends crucially on a household’s demographic and eco-
nomic characteristics as well as on many detailed characteristics of government
programs and policies. The direction, magnitude, and composition of popula-
tion movements across national boundaries can have major implications for the
public sector.
Comprehensive empirical analysis of the ﬁscal impacts of international migra-
tion is very diﬃcult, since migration aﬀects the entirety of the ﬁscal system;
furthermore, its impact on the ﬁscal system operates not only through direct
impacts but through general-equilibrium adjustments of the economy. The im-
portance of such analysis is increasingly recognized, however, and the literature
on this subject is growing. Because the ﬁscal impacts of migration depend so
importantly on the extent of public sector redistribution, it is naturally of in-
terest to pay close attention to the ways that households at the extreme ends
of the income distribution – the rich and the poor – interface with the ﬁscal
system.
Taxation of the Rich. In societies where signiﬁcant amounts of tax are imposed
on personal income or its correlates, the rich will be large ﬁscal contributors.
This is well-illustrated by US experience. As shown in Table 9, a very large share
of personal income taxes in the US are paid by a tiny fraction of the population.
For example, in 2002, over 15% of personal income taxes were paid by only
0.13% of taxpayers; the top 1.9% of taxpayers paid 40% of all personal income
taxes. These are very well-oﬀ individuals and households, and they pay, on
average, $135,000 or more per year in taxes; those in the top income category
pay more than $800,000 in personal income taxes annually. The high degree
of inequality in income tax burdens reﬂects of course both the high degree of
inequality in the distribution of (taxable) income and the progressivity of the
structure of tax rates.
For present purposes, the crucial observation is that the presence or absence
of these high-income taxpayers is a matter of great importance for the US tax
system. A hypothetical exodus of a mere 170,000 taxpayers (those at the very
top) would result in the loss of some 15% of all personal income tax revenues,
amounting to about 1.3% of GDP. In present-value terms, the permanent loss of
these taxpayers would result (depending on the discount rate used) in the loss
of tax revenue equal to 15–50% of one year’s GDP.4 These taxpayers provide
very large amounts of resources with which to ﬁnance the public sector.
Beneﬁts for the Poor. There is a growing body of research detailing the extent
to which immigrants receive social beneﬁts in cash or in kind. In the US, the
ﬁndings of MaCurdy et al. (1998) among many other studies that immigrants
are on balance the beneﬁciaries of ﬁscal transfers. It is recognized, of course,
4It should be noted that “Adjusted Gross Income” is a tax-accounting concept of income.
Much of the true economic income of taxpayers, particularly the rich, is not included in AGI.
The rich thus pay a very high share of taxes, even taking into account the fact that they take
advantage of many opportunities to shelter their income from taxation.
7that this is not necessarily true for all immigrants – a distinction highlighted as
well by Wadensj¨ o and Orrje (2002). These authors ﬁnd that the ﬁscal impact
of “Western” immigrants (roughly, immigrant from OECD countries) on the
Danish economy is rather similar to that of native Danes. As they progress
through the life cycle, these immigrants tend at various stages to make net
contributions to (in mid-life) and to receive net beneﬁts from (when young, and
with children, or old) the ﬁscal system. The experience with “non-Western”
immigrants, on the other hand, is very diﬀerent. These immigrants have quite
diﬀerent labor market experiences, in particular because their employment rates
are relatively low.
This basic conclusion appears also in Hansen and Lofstrom (2001, 2003), who
note that immigrants in Sweden receive social transfers far out of proportion to
their share of the population. As noted above, slightly more than 10% of the
Swedish population is foreign-born. But by the mid-1990s, immigrants were the
recipients of approximately half of Swedish social welfare expenditures (basic
social assistance beneﬁts and unemployment beneﬁts). Hansen and Lofstrom
(2003) compare the employment and social beneﬁt status of native Swedes,
“non-refugee” immigrants, and “refugee” immigrants, and ﬁnd that non-refugee
immigrants do not diﬀer markedly from natives but that refugee immigrants are
much more likely to receive welfare beneﬁts, and to do so persistently, and to
have lower rates of employment.
Riphahn (1998, forthcoming)) analyzes welfare recipiency by immigrants in Ger-
many. Here, too, similar ﬁndings emerge: as in Sweden, welfare recipiency
has risen substantially over time and welfare spending has increased as well.
Whereas foreigners accounted for 8.3% of welfare recipients in 1980, this share
had increased to the 25–35% range (depending on the speciﬁc year) during the
1990s.
The above remarks have focused on the possible ﬁscal impacts of international
migration. There have, however, been numerous analyses of the linkages be-
tween subnational government ﬁscal policies and internal migration in the US.
To cite only one example, Conway and Houtenville (2001) examine the inter-
state migration by the elderly and ﬁnd that they are signiﬁcantly more likely to
migrate toward states that provide more generous social-service support for the
old. This study is of particular interest in that it focuses on a group that tends,
for the most part, to have relatively low migration rates. Borjas (1999) examines
the impacts of subnational ﬁscal policies – the generosity of state-determined
welfare and social service beneﬁts – on the location of immigrants from abroad,
thus highlighting the importance of international migration for the ﬁscal policies
of subnational governments.
Immigration and Intergenerational Transfers. As mentioned earlier, the demo-
graphic importance of immigrants in advanced economies, particularly those of
Western Europe, is virtually certain to rise over time. Given the importance
of public pensions in the ﬁscal systems of these economies and the rapid aging
of their populations, attention is naturally drawn to the possibility of “solv-
ing” pension funding problems through immigration. Storesletten (2000), for
instance, focuses on the US case and shows how a selective immigration policy –
8one that succeeds in attracting high-productivity workers early in their working
lifetimes – could result in a suﬃciently favorable ﬁscal impact that the exist-
ing public pension system would be sustainable over time. Bonin et al. (2000)
present a similar analysis for Germany and ﬁnd also that immigrants are net
contributors to the German public pension system, although intergenerational
ﬁscal imbalances are suﬃciently large that they are not completely oﬀset even
with high levels of immigration.5
Waddensj¨ o and Orrje (2002) also emphasize the life-cycle eﬀects of a migrant’s
ﬁscal interaction and, like Storesletten, show how these eﬀects can be assessed
in present-value terms – a perspective that is particularly helpful when one
recognizes the sometimes lengthy horizons over which migration impacts are
felt. Wildasin (1999) presents estimates of the net present-value impact of
migration in several EU countries, noting that these impacts – for workers with
earnings similar to those of existing residents – can result in positive net ﬁscal
contributions amounting to 15–30% of a migrant’s lifetime wealth.6
To take one more illustrative case, research by Collado and Iturbe-Ormaetxe
(2004) ﬁnd that immigrants to Spain – including recent immigrants from rela-
tively poor countries – also make signiﬁcant positive net ﬁscal impacts, taking
public pension systems into account. Immigrants to Spain have employment
rates as high as or higher than those of natives and earnings that are roughly
75% of the native level. Comparing results for the US presented by Auerbach
and Oreopolous (2000), who ﬁnd that immigrants have only a modest ﬁscal
impact, Collado and Iturbe-Ormaetxe note that human capital and earnings
diﬀerentials between natives and recent immigrants in the US is substantially
larger than is the case for Spain, reﬂecting the characteristics both of native
populations and of immigrants.
In summary, the measurement of the ﬁscal impact of migration is a diﬃcult task,
both conceptually and empirically; this is especially true when the life-cycle
and intergenerational dimensions of migration are considered. The foregoing
remarks are not intended to provide the basis for any summary evaluation of
the net impact of immigration for any one country, much less for a group of
countries. There can be little doubt, however, that demographic change can
have, and have had, quantitatively very important impacts on the ﬁscal systems
of modern economies.
5The fundamental demographics of age imbalances in rich countries and the magnitudes of
immigration that would be needed to oﬀset them, are thoroughly discussed in United Nations
(2000). Age imbalances in the US are modest by comparison with those in a number of West
European countries, including Germany.
6See Ablett (1999) for a study of the ﬁscal impact of immigrants, from a generational
accounting perspective, in Australia. As Table 1 shows, migrants account for an unusually
large share of the population in Australia, making this a particularly important aspect of
generational accounting for that country.
93 Assessing the Degree of Factor Market Integration: To-
ward a Dynamic Perspective
The preceding discussion has provided some indications of recent experience
with labor mobility and some of its possible implications for ﬁscal systems in
advanced economies. However, such descriptive information is ultimately of
limited value, in itself, in determining whether factor mobility is “really impor-
tant” for public ﬁnance. The present section discusses some of the basic insights
to be gleaned from the analysis of ﬁscal competition and some of the diﬃcul-
ties involved in arriving at a satisfactory assessment of the “degree” of factor
mobility.
Competition: A Race to ...?
It is sometimes asserted that competition for mobile resources can lead gov-
ernments into a “race to the bottom,” which is usually interpreted to mean
(vaguely) an outcome in which governments spend (or regulate) “too little,”
i.e., less than is socially optimal. Perhaps it is possible to arrive at a more
accurate assessment of the implications of ﬁscal competition by exploiting the
analogy to competition among ﬁrms in an industry. It is true that competition
can sometimes lead ﬁrms to reduce their prices, but it is not true that com-
petition leads to prices that approach or are close to zero. In a competitive
economy, one can be expect to ﬁnd many diﬀerent types of goods and services,
some of which are low-cost and some of which are high-cost. Competition does
not necessarily lead to prices that approach a “bottom,” but rather to prices
that approach marginal cost. This contributes to the eﬃciency of resource allo-
cation in the absence of market failures, and of course may lead to ineﬃciency
when market failures (for example, due to imperfect information, incomplete-
ness of markets, etc.) do occur. Very similar remarks apply, in general terms,
to the competition among governments.
To be somewhat more precise, consider a typical “ﬁscal competition” situation
in which a jurisdiction utilizes factors of production, such as labor and capital,
which are exchanged on markets both within and without the jurisdiction. As-
suming that the jurisdiction is “small” relative to the relevant external markets,
any policy changes that it undertakes will have no eﬀect on the external prices
of these factors, that is, in the language of international economics, no “terms of
trade” eﬀects. If a given policy attracts some additional units of labor or capital
to the jurisdiction, there will be some ﬁscal impact, of the sort described above.
Immigrants, or new investment, will participate in the local ﬁscal system, and
will (a) make some ﬁscal contributions, present and future, through the revenue
system, and (b) impose some ﬁscal burdens, present and future, by utilizing
public services and programs and necessitating additional public expenditures.
If the latter – the marginal cost of providing public goods and services, includ-
ing cash and in-kind transfers – exceeds the former, in present-value terms, the
incremental units of labor or capital entail a net ﬁscal burden, a cost that must
be absorbed by existing residents or owners of resources located within the juris-
diction. If the ﬁscal contributions exceed the marginal cost of the ﬁscal burden,
the incremental units of labor and capital produce a net beneﬁt from which ex-
10isting residents or owners of resources within the jurisdiction can beneﬁt. In the
simplest models of ﬁscal competition, a jurisdiction adapts its policies so as to
attract mobile resources that produce net ﬁscal beneﬁts and to repel those that
impose net ﬁscal burdens. This can be done by adjusting tax and expenditure
policies, speciﬁcally by lowering taxes or spending more to provide better public
services to attract desired labor or capital and by doing the opposite to repel
labor or capital for which the marginal cost of public service provision exceeds
ﬁscal contributions. Once a jurisdiction has chosen its optimal policy, then for
every mobile resource, the “marginal net ﬁscal beneﬁt” to the jurisdiction from
attracting additional units of that resource, that is, the diﬀerence between ﬁscal
contributions through the revenue system net of the marginal cost of providing
public services, will be driven to zero:7
MNFB = T − MC = 0.
Properly interpreted (or, if necessary, modiﬁed), this simple expression can allow
for many real-world complexities, including dynamic eﬀects and externalities,
and satisfaction of this condition requires optimal adjustment of a wide range
of policies that simultaneously aﬀect many agents within the economy; in prac-
tice, second-best considerations inevitably imply that this condition can only be
approximated. Even allowing for such complexities, however, the basic insight
still remains: the competition for mobile resources is predicted to reduce the
amount of redistribution in the sense that mobile resources must pay in taxes
an amount suﬃcient to cover the cost of the incremental resources expended
by the jurisdiction on account of their presence. In reality, this is process is
unlikely to involve a “race” and it is not necessarily to result in low levels of
taxation and spending; it does, however, put downward pressure on redistribu-
tion, deﬁned as a mismatch or inequality between ﬁscal contributions and ﬁscal
beneﬁts. The analogy to competition among ﬁrms is more apt, in this context,
than the concept of a “race to the bottom.”
The End of the Welfare State?
One way to think about redistributive policies is that they transform a gross
distribution of income (or, better, utility) into a diﬀerent, net distribution of
income. In order to understand the true economic consequences of these poli-
cies, it is necessary to analyze how they aﬀect economic incentives, marketplace
behavior, and equilibrium prices. This is true whether the goal of the analy-
sis is normative or positive. For example, the use of income taxes to ﬁnance
redistributive transfers has been studied from a normative perspective in an
important body of literature on optimal income taxation, given great impetus
by Mirrlees (1971) (but tracing its roots back to Sidgwick (1907)), and from a
political-economy perspective in an equally-impressive body of work of which
Meltzer and Richard (1981) provides one example.8 In both cases, the ana-
7See Wildasin (1998) for further discussion of this and other basic insights from the lit-
erature on ﬁscal competition. A more formal treatment, with many references to previous
literature and with discussion of numerous extensions and qualiﬁcations, appears in Wildasin
(1986, Section 2).
8See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for an overview of this and much other related research
11lysis of public policy – in this case, tax and transfer policy – begins with a
determination of the impact of alternative policies on the economic well-being
of individuals, or, if one prefers to characterize it somewhat diﬀerent, with a
mapping of policies into individual payoﬀs. This includes an analysis of the
eﬀects of policy on economic behavior, classically exempliﬁed by labor/leisure
substitution, which aﬀects the eﬃciency of resource allocation as well as the im-
pact of redistributive policy on the distribution of welfare.9 Understanding this
mapping is the ﬁrst step in a recursive analytical structure. The second step, in
a political economy framework, is to ascertain how and why diﬀerent agents may
inﬂuence the policymaking process, how this depends on the nature of the po-
litical institutions, etc. In a normative analysis, the second step is to determine
which policy alternatives produce better or worse outcomes according to some
normative criteria. The key observation is that both types of analysis require
an understanding of how policies aﬀect the welfare of individuals or households
– sometimes called utility or real income, and frequently approximated, as a
practical matter, by some version of money income. And this requires some
determination of who is aﬀected by public policies, and how.
Traditionally, the literature on redistributive policy assumes (often implicitly)
that the markets within which redistributive policies are implemented are co-
extensive with the boundaries of the jurisdiction that imposes the policies – an
assumption, one should note, that also underlies important early contributions
to the study of ﬁscal federalism. Stigler’s (1957) discussion of the limits of
local redistribution, for example, very explicitly identiﬁes the high degree of
factor mobility facing lower-level governments as a principal reason to shift the
responsibility for redistributive policymaking up to higher-level governments.
Oates (1972) also emphasizes this point, and notes further the importance of
factor mobility for local and regional economic development policies. Brennan
and Buchanan (1980) highlight the role that factor mobility may play as a brake
on redistributive policies. These analysts thus identify ﬁscal competition as a
force that shapes the organization of the public sector in a federation, sometimes
called the “assignment problem” (Breton (1965)). Indeed, generally speaking,
the major redistributive functions of modern governments are undertaken by
national rather than subnational governments, an outcome that is certainly
consistent with the notion that the latter are highly open with respect to factor
movements and are thus less able or less inclined to engage in redistribution –
but only if the former are not so completely open.
But is it the case that national factor markets are “closed” with respect to exter-
nal markets, as in traditional public and international economics approaches?
If so, it is safe to ignore the incentives that redistributive policies create for
the movement of factors of production across national boundaries and to fo-
cus on the labor/leisure, saving/investment, and other traditional margins of
behavioral adjustment to these policies. On the other hand, if national factor
markets are “open,” then factor mobility presents another “behavioral margin”
along which economic agents can adjust in response to the incentives oﬀered by
on political economy.
9The discussion in Mulligan (2001) well illustrates the close connections between optimal
tax analysis and the political economy of redistributive policy.
12redistributive policies and that may bring signiﬁcant competitive pressures to
bear on these policies. But the “welfare state” has not (yet) disappeared, if it
ever will. The preceding discussion has shown that labor mobility is certainly
present within national economies such as those of the US and Canada, but
it is certainly not absent at the international level, either. The same is true
with respect to capital mobility. Are factor markets within countries “more
open” than international factor markets, so that national governments, even if
not fully closed, have a “comparative advantage” in undertaking redistributive
policies? Are international factor markets now “more” open than in the past,
and if so, by how much? Operationally, how does one determine the “degree”
of factor market integration? As we have just noted, the answers to these ques-
tions may potentially carry far-reaching implications, ranging from the possible
erosion of modern welfare states to the reconﬁguration of the institutions of
the public sector including possibly the emergence of new, larger governmental
structures such as an EU that assumes the redistributive role of today’s national
governments.
What Is a Factor Market?
As should be clear by now, the concept of a factor market, and especially the
determination of the geographic scope of a factor market, is a matter of critical
importance for the analysis of the economic eﬀects of public policy, especially
redistributive policy. It is far from a simple task, however, to assess the degree
of integration of factor markets across space. The following remarks indicate
some of pitfalls to be avoided in addressing this issue.
Does Openness Imply Trade? To begin with, evidence of the actual movement
of labor or capital across spatial boundaries such as that presented in Section
2 is, by itself, an indication that factors of production are mobile. However, it
is also an indication of “disequilibrium” in factor markets or, more correctly,
of dynamic adjustment in factor markets, which is not, properly speaking, a
measure of the degree of “openness” or “integration” of markets. To take the
familiar case of interregional or international trade, it is well known that the
economies of two regions can be completely free of any trade barriers or sig-
niﬁcant transactions costs and yet the volume of trade between these regions
can be very small or even zero.10 A high volume of trade between two regions,
in other words, reﬂects not only the degree of openness but also the extent of
diﬀerences in the economic fundamentals that make trade valuable. Exactly
the same remarks apply to factor markets. The absence of factor movements
across space could mean that factors are “non-traded” commodities because of
prohibitive costs. But they can also mean that there is little gain to be real-
ized from factor movements, because, for example, factor returns do not diverge
much across locations.
10Students of economics learn early on, in their ﬁrst exposure to models of trade, that gains
from trade arise among households or economies when there are diﬀerences in preferences,
endowments, and technologies; it is an elementary exercise to use demand and supply or
Edgeworth box analysis to illustrate a “no-trade equilibrium,” that is, a situation in which
exchange, though possible, does not occur in equilibrium. To say that diﬀerences in funda-
mentals are suﬃcient for trade, of course, is not to say that they are necessary. In particular,
in the presence of imperfect competition arising from increasing returns, trade in diﬀerentiated
products can occur even when countries are ex ante identical.
13Of course, if the equilibrium volume of trade ﬂows or factor movements is low,
there is an important sense in which the integration of goods and factor markets
is not important: restriction or elimination of exchange in goods or factors, by
itself, would have little eﬀect on the eﬃciency of resource allocation or on factor
prices and the distribution of income. Nevertheless, the openness of markets can
be very important for public policy purposes, even if the equilibrium volume of
cross-boundary resource ﬂows is small.
To illustrate with a simple neoclassical example: suppose that the economy of
some jurisdiction has a linear homogeneous production technology that uses a
factor of production `, along with some other inputs, to produce output valued
at f(`), where f0(`) > 0 > f00(`). This factor of production could be “labor”
in general, or speciﬁc types of labor (high-skilled, low-skilled, young, old), or
capital, in one form or another. Suppose that this factor of production is freely
mobile and earns a net rate of return w outside of this jurisdiction. Let `0 denote
the amount of the input ` that is supplied within the jurisdiction, so that `−`0
represents the net inﬂow of this input. Suppose that the jurisdiction imposes
a source-based tax τ` on the return to this input. The net rate of return to a
mobile factor of production must be the same internally as externally, and thus,
assuming competitive markets, (1−τ`)f0(`) ≡ w in equilibrium. This condition
can be used to solve for `(τ`), with `0(τ`) = 1/f00(`) < 0. Note that local
taxation of the mobile resource (a) has no eﬀect on the net return to the mobile
resource employed within the jurisdiction – the incidence of the tax is completely
shifted (in fact, is borne by the owners of other immobile resources within the
jurisdiction) and (b) aﬀects the spatial allocation of the mobile resource: the
higher the local tax, the less of the mobile resource that will be employed within
the jurisdiction. It is just this sort of analysis that leads to the conclusion
that ﬁscal competition takes away the incentive for governments to engage in
redistribution: in this setting, redistributive taxes (or transfers) do not actually
aﬀect the net return to mobile factors, but they do impose a net cost, in the
form of allocative eﬀects, on the taxing jurisdiction.
The key point to note here is that these distributional and allocative eﬀects of
the tax are completely independent of the value of `(τ`) − `0: the jurisdiction
may be a large or small importer or exporter of the mobile resource, or perhaps
have absolutely no net trade with the rest of the world. The volume of the
observed factor ﬂow is irrelevant to the basic conclusions of the analysis. Thus,
although the data on migration ﬂows presented in Section 2 does provide an
indication that labor is not completely immobile, it is a mistake to identify the
amount of migration with the amount of mobility of labor: migration requires
both the ability to move and an incentive to do so.
Integration of Factor Markets: Total or Marginal? All economists are aware of
the distinction between the “marginal” and the “inframarginal” consumer. The
inframarginal consumer has settled purchase patterns, always buying the same
brand or product type without bothering to do comparison shopping whether
because of true brand preference or simple inertia and habit. There are other
consumers, however, who are quite prepared to switch their purchasing patterns,
perhaps because their purchasing habits are not well-established or because they
14ﬁnd it less costly to gather information about alternatives. As is well known,
the demand elasticity for a commodity depends critically, and in some cases
exclusively, on the behavior of these marginal consumers.
It is obvious that precisely the same considerations come into play in assessing
factor mobility. Consider two small regions in France, Germany, or Ohio. It is
quite possible that the older, well-established native residents of these regions
have a strong attachment to their home regions, and that ﬂuctuating economic
conditions – expansion in one region, contraction in another – would cause very
few of them to relocate, as this would entail giving up valued networks of so-
cial relations in addition to many other tangible and intangible costs. Even
so, younger residents of these regions, just ﬁnishing their education and enter-
ing the labor force, often unmarried and with no children, might ﬁnd a move
toward more vibrant employment prospects well worth the cost and risk in-
volved. And even if these young natives remain closely attached to their home
regions, consider the situation facing immigrant workers freshly arrived from
Algeria, Turkey, or Mexico. These workers may well face linguistic, cultural,
and other relocation costs that far exceed some of those that confront natives,
and perhaps just for that reason are especially likely to be alert to promising
employment opportunities, in each instance shunning the declining region while
making themselves readily available to employers in the expanding region.11
The presence of such “marginal” migrants implies that the allocation of labor
resources among regions is sensitive to demand ﬂuctuations and that the impact
of demand ﬂuctuations on equilibrium wages is smaller than would otherwise be
the case, thus contributing to the eﬀective integration of labor markets across
space.12 Exactly analogous remarks apply to the movement of capital and to
the spatial organization of ﬁrms and industries.
These observations can be illustrated formally using the simple model sketched
above. If `0 units of a productive resource are supplied within a jurisdiction,
and if some fraction α ∈ [0,1] of this resource is absolutely immobile, the critical
question is whether the demand for the resource within the jurisdiction ` exceeds
α`0; in particular, this condition will always be satisﬁed if ` > `0, that is, if the
11It goes without saying that “chain” or “network” migration plays an important role in
shaping migration paths both within and among countries. Chain migration is essentially
a form of learning-by-doing and can be expected to give rise to path-dependence and other
increasing-returns phenomena, making this one of several instances in which there are sig-
niﬁcant beneﬁts to be gained from explicit consideration of the dynamics of factor mobility.
These phenomena do not, however, fundamentally undercut the basic fact that young workers
or immigrants contribute substantially to the integration of regional labor markets even when
many participants in those markets may be relatively immobile; indeed, network migration
means that the eﬀects of policies on the location of workers can be protracted and cumulative,
as discussed by Thum (2000).
12Immigration in the US is characterized by clustering of immigrants in so-called “gateway
cities” like New York, Los Angeles, or Miami, and some have attempted to gauge the impact
of immigration on US labor markets by examining whether the presence of large numbers
of immigrants in these cities puts downward pressure on wages relative to cities with fewer
immigrants. Studies of internal migration in the US invariably ﬁnd that migrants tend to
relocate away from regions with slack demand for labor to regions with high demand, however,
which means that heavy ﬂows of immigrants into gateway cities is likely to reduce the ﬂow
of native workers into those cities. As a result, any downward wage pressure resulting from
immigration is transmitted to other regions in the country and is not conﬁned to metropolitan
areas with large concentrations of immigrants.
15jurisdiction is a net importer of the mobile resource. Provided that this is the
case, the fact that some units of the input are immobile carries no implications
at all for the allocation of resources, for the distribution of income, or for policies
that do not perturb existing equilibrium allocations too much.
Integration of Factor Markets As a Policy Choice. There are many direct and
indirect costs associated with the ﬂow of resources across space. The develop-
ment of new production facilities, distribution networks, or other non-ﬁnancial
assets (including intangible assets like innovations or recognizable trademarks)
in new locations, whether within a given country or in a new country, is a costly
and time-consuming process. Households a variety of tangible and intangible
costs when they relocate. These include the out-of-pocket costs associated with
moving but also the costs of forming new market relationships, the costs of dis-
rupting valuable social relationships (including family, religious, and ethnic ties),
and perhaps the cost of learning new languages. It is true that the development
of information technology has reduced the costs of many forms of communica-
tions and has made it possible to execute ﬁnancial transactions, such as the
buying and selling of ﬁnancial assets, at much lower costs (including time costs)
than was true in the past, and, for some purposes, these costs may be treated
as negligible. In general, however, there are real economic costs, tangible and
intangible, associated with the movement of factors of production. These costs
depend on “technology,” broadly deﬁned; for example, the cost of crossing the
world’s oceans are much lower today than was true one or two centuries ago,
and young people, in some parts of the world, have better access to linguistic
and other forms of education that lower the cost of moving.
These fundamental costs of factor mobility should be distinguished sharply from
policy barriers to factor mobility. These can take many forms and are gener-
ally most important and certainly most conspicuous at the international level.
Countries frequently impose direct controls over the movement of capital and
labor across international boundaries. In the European context, these controls
were most dramatically manifested during the period of Soviet dominance over
Eastern Europe by controls on emigration from Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union, exempliﬁed by the Berlin Wall. The “planned” economies also commonly
utilized internal passport controls (such as China’s hukou system) which inhib-
ited the movement of people within national boundaries, as did South Africa
during the apartheid era (Wildasin (2003, b)). Of course, the rich countries of
the world have utilized explicit controls on immigration, such as immigration
quotas, for many decades.13
13In this as in other aspects of public policy, it is important to distinguish between de jure
and de facto policies. According to the US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
(2000), which provides estimates of illegal immigration for the period 1990-2000, there were
3.5 million illegal immigrants in the US in 1990, a number that grew to 7 million by the
year 2000, an average annual inﬂow of about 0.35 million. These ﬁgures may be compared
to a ﬂow of 4.5 million legal immigrants during the decade 1971–1980, 7.3 million during
1981–1990, and 9.1 million during 1991–2000. This high level of illegal immigration is hardly
a new phenomenon in the US. Although it is impossible to obtain highly accurate data, it
is noteworthy that the number of illegal immigrants in the US was reduced by about 2.7
million people during 1987–1988 as a result of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act
which in eﬀect provided an amnesty for some illegal immigrants. Roughly speaking, one could
conclude that illegal immigrants constitute about 20–30% of total annual immigrant ﬂow in
16In addition to direct controls over labor and capital movements, there are many
other policies that can impede factor mobility. other objectives they may
achieve, regulatory policies such as occupational licensure can raise the costs
for teachers, health-care workers, lawyers, and other service providers to qual-
ify for employment in jurisdictions other than those where they were trained.
Land-use controls, rent controls, and other regulations governing housing mar-
kets can constrain the ability of workers to move into jurisdictions where their
skills are in demand. Similarly, there are many potential policy impediments
to capital mobility, including explicit controls on ﬁnancial ﬂows, prohibitions
on foreign ownership of capital assets, discriminatory tax and regulatory poli-
cies, and many others. (For instance, Summers (1988) notes that tariﬀ and
other trade policies that limit current account deﬁcits also have the eﬀect of
constraining capital inﬂows.)
For some purposes of policy analysis, the policy barriers to factor mobility should
of course be taken as given. For instance, many discussions of European mon-
etary union during the past decade have alluded to Mundell’s (1961) theory of
optimal currency areas, deﬁning these to be areas within which labor is not very
mobile. In this context, attention focuses on the possible use of discretionary
macroeconomic policies to manage short-term ﬂuctuations, with little concern
for the allocative or distributional consequences of labor mobility.14 For other
purposes, on the other hand, the policy barriers to factor mobility cannot be
ignored, even if, or indeed precisely because, they may be very eﬀective in limit-
ing factor movements. By way of analogy, imagine a country that has imposed
tariﬀs that are so high as to reduce trade to zero. The fact that trade is not
observed empirically certainly does not mean that trade is not an important
policy issue; on the contrary, it might well be the most important policy issue
facing the country. Similarly, a tax that is levied at a suﬃciently high rate can
raise almost no revenue and yet cause great economic harm. The division of
Korean peninsula today provides an example, not unlike that of pre-uniﬁcation
Germany, of a situation where migration is very close to zero but where (im-
pending) labor mobility is an economic and public policy issue of fundamental
importance, precisely because the observed immobility of labor is attributable
to a policy (that of North Korea) that can be expected to change (as soon as
the North Korean regime collapses).
Gross vs. Net Flows. Many economic analyses of factor ﬂows tend to focus on
net capital and labor (or population) ﬂows. This emphasis is not surprising,
given the common practice in macroeconomic analysis of using simple aggregate
recent decades. Since the presence of large numbers of illegal immigrants has been well-known
for such a long period of time, it is diﬃcult to escape the conclusion that US policy, de facto,
has been to allow much higher levels of immigration than the de jure policy would suggest.
Similar remarks undoubtedly apply, though perhaps with less force, in Western Europe.
14There seems to be little or no consensus, operationally speaking, about the degree of labor
mobility that is needed to establish an optimal currency area. Perhaps this is partly because
there is considerable debate about the desirability of using monetary policy to manage short-
term economic ﬂuctuations. The formation of a currency union involves a structural change
in the institutions of monetary policymaking, and raises much deeper issues than those that
arise in the context of short-run macro policy, notably, whether monetary union strengthens
or weakens central bank independence and whether it hardens or softens the constraints under
which ﬁscal policies are made. See, e.g., McKinnon (1997a, 1997b).
17production functions of the form F(K,L) to describe input-output relationships
and (functional) income distribution. In such a framework, the total stocks of
capital and labor – and, thus, total output and the distribution of income –
are aﬀected, if at all, only by net ﬂows across boundaries. Any large inﬂow of
labor or capital that is oﬀset by an equally large outﬂow is predicted, within
the context of the model, to have no economic signiﬁcance. Indeed, within
the context of the model, such oﬀsetting ﬂows would have to be regarded as
wasteful, to the extent that there is any cost associated with factor ﬂows.
In reality, as noted in Section 2, many jurisdictions exhibit gross factor ﬂows
that are often several greater than net factor ﬂows. Within and among coun-
tries, labor and capital are observed to ﬂow in opposing directions – and this is
a persistent feature of factor markets. Little research has been done to date on
the explanations for such factor ﬂows. One possibility is that these oﬀsetting
ﬂows are truly wasteful, for instance because there are informational or other
ineﬃciencies that result in “churning” of factor allocations.15 However, it is also
quite likely that gross ﬂows reﬂect underlying heterogeneity of factors: German
manufacturing ﬁrms that invest in plants in Italy are identical neither to Ital-
ian retailing ﬁrms investing in Germany nor to existing manufacturing ﬁrms in
Italy; doctors relocating from Canada to the US are identical neither to existing
doctors in the US nor to US software engineers relocating to Canada. More
than 15% of the college graduates trained in 6 of 9 regions in the US leave these
regions within 5 years of graduation, and more than 15% of the college grad-
uates within these regions will have arrived within the past 5 years (Kodrycki
(2001)). Irish workers migrate abroad for a period of time, returning to jobs
in Ireland after a period of work abroad, are not identical to Irish workers who
remain in Ireland (Barrett (2002), Barrett and O’Connell (2001)) without ven-
turing abroad. These ﬂows of labor and capital may largely oﬀset each other
in aggregate terms. It would be a major error, however, to conclude that only
net ﬂows “matter,” just as it would be a major error to infer that a country
with balanced trade (imports equal in value to exports) would be unaﬀected by
a complete cessation of trade with the rest of the world. Furthermore, ignoring
gross ﬂows can lead to major misunderstanding of the consequences of ﬁscal
policies. A policy that taxes one group of workers or ﬁrms to subsidize another
group may have no eﬀect at all on the total number of workers or amount of
capital in a jurisdiction if all workers or capital are completely immobile; it can
also have no eﬀect at all if both groups are mobile, but outﬂows of one group
oﬀset inﬂows of the other group. The distributional and eﬃciency eﬀects of this
tax/transfer policy will be quite diﬀerent in these two cases: whereas there may
be large distributional impacts and small allocative losses from the policy in the
ﬁrst case, precisely the reverse can happen in the second case.
To illustrate, suppose that output within a region is a linear homogeneous and
concave function of some immobile resources (for example, natural resources or
capital) together with two potentially mobile factors of production, `1 and `2
(for example, high-skilled and low-skilled labor). Suppose that the government
imposes a tax τ1 > 0 on the ﬁrst of these inputs and uses the proceeds to
15For one example of a model in which informational asymmetries result in eﬃcient turnover
of labor among ﬁrms or jurisdictions, see Wildasin and Wilson (1996).
18ﬁnance a subsidy σ2 > 0 to the second. If these inputs are ﬁxed in supply, then
this redistributive policy has no eﬀect on the marginal productivity and thus
the gross return to each input – i.e., total output and the gross distribution of
income is unaﬀected by this tax/transfer policy. The distribution of net income
is, however, altered: the net income of the ﬁrst input falls by τ1 per unit while
the net income of the second rises by σ2. The gross and net income of the other,
immobile, productive factors are both unaﬀected by this policy.
Now suppose that both inputs are mobile, at least at the margin, and let w1
and w2 denote the prices of these inputs on external markets. Assuming that
the production function f(`1,`2) is strictly concave, the equilibrium conditions
f1 − τ1 = w1
f2 + σ2 = w2
together with the government budget constraint
τ1`1 = σ2`2
can be used to solve for li(τ1). In general, the precise quantitative response of
`i to a (balanced-budget) change in τ1 depends on the form of the production
function and on the initial value of τ1, but, given adequate substitutability
between these inputs, `0
1(τ1) < 0 < `0
2(τ1), that is, an increase in the level of
redistributive transfers will reduce the equilibrium quantity of the taxed input
and increase the equilibrium quantity of the subsidized input. In simple if
somewhat special cases, the “total amount” of these inputs, `1 + `2 (say, the
sum of the number of high-skilled and low-skilled workers) is unaﬀected by the
choice of τ1 and σ2, that is, the introduction (or expansion) of this redistributive
policy may result in “zero net factor ﬂows” – assuming that diﬀerent factors
of production are (inappropriately) added together. Now, however, oﬀsetting
gross factor ﬂows mean that (a) the tax/transfer policy has no eﬀect on the
distribution of net income within the jurisdiction, (b) the before-tax return to
the taxed (subsidized) input rises (falls) by the full amount of the tax (subsidy),
and (c) the gross and net incomes of the other, immobile factors of production in
the jurisdiction are reduced.16 Furthermore, the aggregation of oﬀsetting gross
ﬂows into net ﬂows may incorrectly suggest that redistributive ﬁscal policies
have zero or negligible impacts on the movement of labor or capital.
Mobility of Fiscal Flows vs. Mobility of Factors. For public-ﬁnance purposes,
factor mobility can take forms that do not necessarily correspond to factor ﬂows
as normally measured for purposes of demography, national income accounting,
or other purposes. For example, the term “migration” is normally used in a
demographic sense to refer to a person’s place of residence. A place of residence
is also a place where an individual’s income is subject to taxation. It need not,
however, correspond to the place where an individual’s income is generated, or
where an individual utilizes publicly-provided services.
16Proof: Using the equilibrium condition and government budget-balance constraint to
solve for `i(τ1), diﬀerentiate f(`1(τ1),`2(τ1))−
P
i `i(τ1)fi(`1(τ1),`2(τ1)) with respect to τ1.
Details are given in Wildasin (1992).
19This concept is very familiar at small geographic scales: a perennial issue in lo-
cal public ﬁnance, for example, concerns the taxation of commuters who (clas-
sically) may work in a central city but reside in a suburb. The central city
may enjoy some revenue ﬂow from the taxation of employer’s payrolls or from
taxation of consumption by commuters, while on the other side of the ﬁscal ac-
counts it may have to incur extra costs to provide public safety, transportation,
or other services enjoyed by commuters. In this context, labor mobility can be
very important for ﬁscal purposes even if it does not correspond to “migration”
in its classic demographic sense.
Though less often noted, considerable international mobility of labor occurs
other than that which is normally called “migration.” In the European context,
one need only consider the operations of any major European corporation. In-
variably, these corporations have plants, distribution networks, customers, and
other business relations that span multiple countries. Not only the proﬁtability
but the very existence of these forms of business organization depend critically
on the ability of the business’ employees – especially upper-level employees such
as top executives – to travel freely to conduct meetings, oversee operations, de-
velop client relationships, or, in some other of a multitude of ways, to engage
in business communications and activities. The productivity of many if not all
business managers, industry scientists, or ﬁnancial oﬃcers would be dramati-
cally limited if it were impossible to move freely for purposes of business travel
– which is to say that a substantial portion of the income of such workers is
dependent on mobility and thus, in economic terms, is earned in those locations
to which the worker travels.17 For tax purposes, however, earnings and income
taxation is based on the location where a worker resides. Since the taxation of
highly-compensated workers accounts for a very large fraction of tax revenues,
the ﬁscal implications of “non-migration” labor mobility can be very high.
Very similar issues arise with respect to the taxation of ﬁrms and the issue of
capital mobility. Because of the ﬂexibility with which business structures can
be organized, it is a comparatively simple matter for one business to employ
workers, utilize ﬁxed capital assets, and produce goods in one location and for
most or all of the net income generated by these business activities to accrue to
a diﬀerent business located in an entirely diﬀerent jurisdiction. The apportion-
ment of corporation income for tax purposes is one possible method by which
governments can attempt to grapple with this problem, but this solution, if it
can be called that, is highly imperfect. At the international level, tax treaties
could conceivably provide a means by which business income could be linked
to taxable entities in various jurisdictions. The topic of business organizational
structure and business taxation is a complex one that cannot be discussed at
length in this paper, but the key point to note is that the location of “capital
income” for tax purposes need not bear a particularly obvious relationship to
the “capital stock” as measured for many other purposes.
17To the author’s knowledge, no careful analysis has been made of the relationship between
business organizational form and the mobility of managers and executives. Business travel can
readily be observed, on a daily basis, in the major airports and train stations of any advanced
economy. Systematic research on this issue, both theoretical and empirical, would be most
worthwhile.
20A Dynamic Perspective
Historical studies (see, e.g., Hatton and Williamson (1994) and references therein)
attest to the importance of international movements of labor and capital in past
eras when the fundamental costs of factor mobility were far higher than today.
Capital and labor are drawn to regions where factor returns are high, and these
factor movements contribute to the equalization of factor returns. The fact that
regions like North America continue to attract labor even after centuries of im-
migration demonstrates, however, that the adjustment of the world’s stocks of
labor and capital is far from an instantaneous process. Indeed, the US has wit-
nessed net internal migration ﬂows (for example, toward the Paciﬁc) that have
persisted for many decades, contributing, but only gradually, to the equalization
of incomes among regions. Decressin and Fatas (1995) show that the speed of
adjustment of labor ﬂows in response to regional demand shocks in Europe is
slower than in the US – but that this adjustment process is also time-consuming
in the US, as well. Similarly, Coulombe (2003) ﬁnds that interprovincial migra-
tion ﬂows within Canada respond relatively modestly to cyclical ﬂuctuations in
labor demand but depend much more heavily on longer-term structural labor
market conditions.
These considerations suggest that the “degree” of factor mobility depends on
the time horizon allowed for factor movements to occur. In general, one would
expect that factor movements that are cheap and easily reversible would occur
rapidly while those that are very costly and diﬃcult to reverse would occur
more slowly. These costs vary from one factor to another and depend both
on economic fundamentals as well as on policy barriers. Just as adjustment
costs play a central role in the analysis of the investment behavior of ﬁrms,
industries, and entire economies, so the adjustment of a region’s stocks of capital
and labor should be expected to depend on the cost of factor movements across
space. The rate of factor movement – as measured by factor movements or
investment ﬂows – is determined by economic agents (households and ﬁrms)
balancing costs and beneﬁts, and can be great or small depending on the payoﬀs
and impediments to such movement. In addition, the speeds of adjustment of
diﬀerent factors of production are presumably interrelated, possibly in complex
ways. The degree of labor mobility, for example, presumably depends on the
degree of capital mobility. Nineteenth-century migration from the Old World
to the New (Hatton and Williamson (1994)) was accompanied by capital ﬂows
in the same direction: growing availability of labor created larger inducements
for capital investments, and conversely. It is easy to envisage models in which
rapidly and slowly adjusting factors exhibit complex dynamics.18
Viewed from this perspective, idealized theoretical models in which factors of
production are assumed, alternatively, to be either completely immobile or freely
mobile, are not well-suited to guide empirical research on ﬁscal competition. As
the data described in Section 2 indicate, the glass of factor mobility at any
geographic scale is always half full and half empty: factor movements occur,
are larger in some contexts than in others, but are never instantaneous and are
18For discussions that emphasize the role of human capital as a slowly-adjusting factor and
the way that this interacts with rapidly-adjusting capital, see Kremer and Thomson (1998)
and Ducynski (2000).
21always limited in magnitude. These are the data on which empirical research on
factor market integration must be based, and it is therefore desirable to develop
theoretical models that can ﬁt these basic facts. Adjustment cost models of the
type that have become standard in empirical research on investment would seem
to oﬀer one convenient analytical framework that can not only guide empirical
research, but that can also be utilized to develop theoretical models with which
to interpret the ﬁndings of empirical research. For instance, in one simple ap-
plication of this approach (Wildasin, 2000,a, 2003, a), the “degree of mobility”
of a productive resource is characterized by the (endogenously-determined, em-
pirically observed) speed with which the stock of a factor of production within
a jurisdiction adjusts to changes in rates of return. The competition for this
resource leads a small, open jurisdiction to impose a net ﬁscal burden on it that
is inversely proportional to this speed of adjustment; thus, a highly mobile re-
source is taxed less heavily than one that is more mobile. Of course, the explicit
introduction of dynamic adjustment immediately adds a host of complications
to theoretical work, including notably the proper treatment of dynamic policy
choice. This issue is discussed further below.
4 Factor Mobility and Its Implications
This concluding section explores some of the implications of the preceding dis-
cussion for several important policy and research issues.
The Eﬃciency and Distributional Eﬀects of Factor Mobility
What are the eﬃciency gains from factor mobility? This question has rarely been
addressed quantitatively. A CGE analysis by Hamilton and Whalley (1984) es-
timated that the world economy would reap large eﬃciency gains if labor could
move freely to wherever it could be most productively employed. But the oppor-
tunities for empirical research on this question appear to be very substantial and
so far largely unexploited.19 For example, as noted in Section 2, the US economy
exhibits substantial ongoing internal migration. Is this migration productive?
By how much would US GDP be diminished if, hypothetically, the country were
divided into, say, 15 isolated regions? What would be the eﬃciency losses from
a partial or total blockage of migration by workers if the conditions for capital
mobility were left unchanged, and conversely? The answers to these questions
would be of interest not only because they would shed light on the economic
development of the US, but because they would provide some guidance in as-
sessing the potential gains from liberalization of factor ﬂows elsewhere in the
world – for instance, within the EU.
Of course, factor movements aﬀect factor prices: inﬂows of workers, for example,
put downward pressure on the wages of other, highly-substitutable workers, and
raise the returns to complementary inputs. These distributional eﬀects may
work in the same direction as public-sector redistributive policies or in opposing
directions. These eﬀects – like the eﬃciency gains from factor mobility – are
19However, see Heijdra et al. (2002) for discussion of the some of the eﬃciency gains from
EU enlargement.
22likely to vary over time and thus should be analyzed in a dynamic setting. For
example, although “refugee” or “non-Western” immigrants may arrive in EU
countries with very low skills and thus weaken labor market conditions for native
low-skill workers, they (or their oﬀspring) may compete with higher-skill workers
as time passes and they become better educated, more language-proﬁcient, or
otherwise better-assimilated.
Factor market integration can also aﬀect income risk. For example, the constant
migration ﬂows of highly-educated workers in the labor markets of North Amer-
ica suggests that demand conditions for these workers change unpredictably over
time. From the viewpoint of the individual worker, the ability to relocate in
order to take advantage of better labor market opportunities means that the
lifetime path of earnings is higher than it would otherwise be, but for work-
ers as a group, it also means that earnings are more uniform across regions
and thus less risky, when seen from an ex ante perspective. Capital ﬂows
likewise reduce the riskiness of returns to capital. More stable factor prices
reduce the cost of income risk, reduce the value of public policies that oﬀset
ﬂuctuating incomes, can encourage greater investment in human or non-human
capital by risk-averse factor owners (Wildasin, 2000, b), and may alter the de-
mand for private-market institutions (especially through ﬁnancial and insurance
markets) for risk-sharing. On the other hand, reduced income risk for mobile
factors of production may mean that immobile factors end up absorbing more
risk (Wildasin, 1995); for example, if young workers leave Eastern Europe or
Eastern Germany for better jobs in the West, they may reduce the already low
rate of return on existing capital in their native regions and thus exacerbate a
loss of income already suﬀered by owners of “old” capital in these regions. The
implications of factor market integration for the distribution of income risk are
thus complex, especially when one recognizes that the prices of diﬀerent factors
of production – capital and labor of many diﬀerent types – are simultaneously
determined through a general-equilibrium mechanism.
These and other economic eﬀects of factor-market integration have been exam-
ined in previous theoretical analyses but are not yet well-understood in practice.
This is an important area for further investigation since the analysis of ﬁscal
competition depends ﬁrst and foremost on a clear understanding of the workings
of factor markets.
Factor Mobility and Political Economy
A memorable phrase in Samuelson’s (1947) Foundations of Economic Analysis
identiﬁes theoretical results that are potentially empirically refutable as “mean-
ingful theorems”. The speciﬁc context of Samuelson’s remark was the derivation
of comparative statics results for the theory of the consumer. In essence, Samuel-
son’s remark emphasizes that the purpose of utility theory, from the viewpoint of
empirical testing, is merely to form a bridge between changes in one observable,
the household’s budget constraint, and another observable, the household’s con-
sumption choice. The inner workings of the consumer’s subjective preferences
are not themselves observable and therefore, from an operational viewpoint, are
“meaningless.” The integration of factor markets – if it can be deﬁned oper-
ationally – may provide the opportunity to formulate “meaningful theorems”
23about public sector decisionmaking. Models of ﬁscal competition are ultimately
predictive models of government policymaking. What are some of the testable
implications that emerge from the analysis of ﬁscal competition?
Exit vs. Voice. As mentioned above, the study of the political economy of
redistributive policy requires, ﬁrst, an understanding of how diﬀerent policies
aﬀect the interests of diﬀerent potential participants in the policymaking pro-
cess. In the simplest models of ﬁscal competition, the net incomes of the owners
of freely-mobile resources are unaﬀected by changes in the ﬁscal treatment of
these resources, in contrast to the situation facing immobile resources. Freely-
mobile resources enjoy the ultimate in “exit” options, and thus their owners
have no reason to exercise “voice” (Hirschman 1970).
This simple observation leads to some potentially interesting predictions. For
example: participation in the political process through voting, lobbying, or by
other means yields no beneﬁt to the owners of mobile resources; since these ac-
tivities are costly, they would be predicted not to engage in them (see Wildasin,
forthcoming, for more discussion). To a rough ﬁrst approximation, this simple
observation could help to explain low voter participation rates by young people
or renters who are relatively mobile compared to older people or homeowners.
Conversely, the owners of immobile resources do have an incentive to participate
in the political process. The interests of those who participate in this process –
for example, older workers or owners of sector-speciﬁc ﬁxed capital investments
– may come into conﬂict, and each may attempt to inﬂuence tax and expen-
diture policy in their own self-interest. In doing so, one group may succeed in
extracting net transfers from the other, normally at some net cost in terms of
eﬃciency losses from the distortion of economic incentives. While it is true that
some of those who exercise “voice” may gain, others will lose. The observed
“rate of return” on participation in the political process will thus be negative
for some – while those who rationally do not participate (the owners of mobile
resources) are not harmed by their lack of voice.
Marceau and Smart (2003) explore lobbying for favorably ﬁscal treatment by
industries in a non-spatial context, and show that industries for which the cost
of adjustment of the capital stock is high are likely to engage more intensively
in costly lobbying activities, and in doing so are likely to secure more favorable
ﬁscal treatment. Net of lobbying costs, however, they can end up with lower
returns than industries that have lower adjustment costs and therefore rationally
engage in less lobbying. If one observes that the cost of capital relocation is a
form of adjustment cost, then the Marceau-Smart analysis can be interpreted
roughly as conﬁrming the foregoing remarks: owners of more mobile resources
lobby less, while those who own less mobile resources may lobby more but still
end up worse oﬀ. Although the Marceau-Smart analysis does not involve explicit
dynamics, empirical analysis of the dynamics of the adjustment of factor stocks
would provide a basis for assessing the degree of factor mobility for diﬀerent
factors of production and thus form a basis for predictions about the extent of
lobbying eﬀort by diﬀerent groups.
An issue that warrants mention in this context is that of “ﬁscal discrimination”
between native and non-native residents or factor owners generally. The nature
24of competition for mobile resources can change quite substantially if there are
ways – direct or indirect – through which the ﬁscal treatment of “marginal”
factor owners is decoupled from that of “incumbent” factor owners. (Section
3’s of “total” and “marginal” integration of factor markets can be seen as one
way to distinguish between “incumbent” and “marginal” factor owners.) For
instance, governments may facilitate or impede the delivery of social services,
education, or other beneﬁts to recent immigrants or oﬀer special relocation
incentives to ﬁrms, workers in “high demand” skill categories, or immigrant
entrepreneurs. Fiscal incentives to compete for mobile resources could make it
diﬃcult to sustain eﬀective political coalitions among incumbent and marginal
owners of a given type of resource, whenever it is feasible to apply diﬀerentiated
policies to them.
Comparative Public Finance
The simplest models of ﬁscal competition treat individual jurisdictions as though
they serve the interests of a single representative household. Other analyses
model the political process much more explicitly, distinguishing, for example,
between direct democracy and representative government or between “pres-
idential” and “parliamentary” systems of government (see, e.g., Janeba and
Schelderup (2002)). Analyses of this type permit potentially testable implica-
tions that could be assessed by comparing policymaking in diﬀerent countries.
EU Enlargement, Factor Market Integration, and Fiscal Competition
The planned enlargement of the EU can be expected to aﬀect many aspects of
policymaking in EU countries. In particular, it will liberalize trade in goods
and services which might have the eﬀect of reducing migration pressure from
Eastern Europe (Mundell (1957)). Increased trade liberalization might then
increase the demand for national governments to protect declining sectors and
sector-speciﬁc factors of production, resulting in higher levels of redistribution
(Rodrik (1998)).
On the other hand, EU enlargement also liberalizes border controls, allowing
citizens from new member states to travel freely to the West and to seek em-
ployment there. And the experience of the internal labor markets of Canada
and the US suggests that liberalized trade in goods and services among regions
within a country does not remove the incentives for movements of productive
resources; indeed, it is quite possible, empirically, that “trade and migration are
complements.”
The extent to which East-West migration is aﬀected by EU enlargement remains
to be seen. A recent survey of public opinion about EU membership among
residents of 13 candidate member states (European Commission, 2002; Fig.
4.1.3 and Table 4.1c) led to some rather striking ﬁndings about the perceived
beneﬁts of EU membership, however. When asked to identify the meaning of
“being a citizen of Europe,” 72% of respondents cited the “right to work in
any country in the EU,” 69% cited “being able to study in any EU country,”
and 68% cited the right to move permanently to any country in the EU” as the
top three (obviously non-exclusive) choices. “Access to health care and social
welfare beneﬁts anywhere in the EU” came fourth at 58%, while political rights
25(the right to vote in European parliament, local, or national elections) all were
cited by fewer than one-third of respondents. These opinions are found across all
candidate countries: 75% of Turkish respondents cite “Right to Move” as most
important, for instance, but this ﬁgure was very high elsewhere, too: it exceeds
50% for all countries and exceeds two-thirds for all but Malta and Slovenia; it
exceeds 80% in Cyprus, Estonia, and Hungary.20
If EU enlargement leads to greater factor mobility and to more competition for
mobile resources among EU countries, then, far from increasing the pressures on
national governments to provide greater protection from trade shocks, enlarge-
ment may instead put added constraints on some of the redistributive policies of
these governments. If existing institutions – i.e.,national governments operating
with a high degree of ﬁscal autonomy – cannot meet demands for redistributive
policies, then EU enlargement may give rise to further demands for new insti-
tutional structures that either reduce national ﬁscal autonomy (e.g., through
binding agreements to coordinate ﬁscal policies) or to endow the EU itself with
the power and autonomy to undertake redistributive policies itself – perhaps
ultimately supplanting the role of national governments in this sphere of poli-
cymaking. In view of the great diversity of existing national policies and of the
varied political interests that they reﬂect, either of these paths of institutional
development will have to confront serious obstacles.
5 Conclusion
Migration is an age-old phenomenon and its economic consequences have always
been important. Capital mobility has likewise played an important role in eco-
nomic growth and development. As demonstrated by O’Rourke and Williamson
(1999) (and references therein), transatlantic capital and labor ﬂows had major
impacts on wages, returns to capital, and land rents – on both sides of the At-
lantic – throughout the nineteenth century. Indeed, the economic development
of the entire western hemisphere over a period of several centuries has depended
critically not only upon international movements of capital and labor but upon
internal factor movements as well. The story is no diﬀerent in Europe, where the
growth of now-advanced economies has depended crucially on the intertwined
processes of industrialization and rural-urban reallocations of labor and capi-
tal. Whether assessed in terms of overall macroeconomic growth or in terms of
the distribution of income, the gradual integration of internal and international
factor markets has had profound economic implications.
There is, however, “something new under the sun.” The economic eﬀects and the
economic determinants of migration and capital mobility during the last half-
century diﬀer from that of previous periods because of the growth of the public
sector and particularly because of the expansion of the redistributive activities
of government. Historically, and with notable exceptions (e.g., enslavement and
the escape from slavery), the principal beneﬁts and costs of migration and of
capital movements have accrued to migrants themselves and to capital own-
20I am grateful to M. Gabel for bringing this study to my attention.
26ers. By moving themselves or by relocating the capital that they own, workers
and capital owners have achieved diﬀerent (normally higher) levels of income,
and have enjoyed diﬀerent (normally higher) levels of consumption, than would
otherwise have been attainable.
By contrast, modern welfare states collect one-third to one-half of national in-
come through a variety of revenue instruments, depending primarily on the
taxation of household income and consumption, and they spend most of this
revenue on cash and in-kind transfers to households. For individual households,
these taxes and transfers seldom net out to zero; instead, most households, at
particular periods of time and throughout their lifetimes, are (or would be) net
contributors to or net beneﬁciaries of the ﬁscal systems in the national and
subnational jurisdictions in which they do (or could) reside. For this reason, a
substantial portion of the economic impact of factor movements accrues not to
factor owners themselves but to others in the jurisdictions to and from which
these productive resources ﬂow. The eﬃciency and distributional implications
of factor market integration are thus very diﬀerent in modern economies, pre-
senting new and far-reaching challenges for public policy and, indeed, for the
structure and organization of the public sector itself. Recent controversies re-
garding EU enlargement and the EU constitution exemplify these challenges.
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A Note on the Development of Modeling Traditions in Public and
International Economics
Eli Heckscher’s name is most familiar to modern economists because of his
contributions to international trade theory. Heckscher’s Mercantilism (1934) is
much less well known, though it is still considered to be an important reference
on the subject. There is an interesting connection between Heckscher’s historical
studies, the Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade, and modern public
economics. In brief, Heckscher views the mercantilist period as one in which
national governments grew in importance as loci of economic policymaking,
in signiﬁcant part by asserting dominance over older policymaking institutions
that operated on smaller geographical scales. He notes that local guilds and
municipal authorities had traditionally exerted great inﬂuence over “external”
commerce, including restrictions on trade among regions and also, signiﬁcantly,
on the movement of labor among regions.
As Heckscher shows, the liberalization of national internal markets was not a
smooth or rapid process, nor was it brought about by deliberate design. It was
the consequence of the evolution of institutions and structures of governance.
By the 1920s, the process of urbanization associated with the development of
modern industry had revealed the power of relatively free internal markets for
labor and capital to draw resources away from rural areas into cities. It is
thus natural for authors such as Ohlin (1924) to emphasize the integration of
factor markets within nations, laying the groundwork for the stylized textbook
Heckscher-Ohlin model which reduces countries, spatially speaking, to dimen-
sionless points within with factors of production ﬂow freely among sectors, and
among which factors of production cannot move at all. This would not have
been the model that Heckscher would have applied to mercantilist Europe: the
economies of England, France, and Germany at that time were highly frag-
mented and there were many impediments – speciﬁcally, policy impediments –
to the free movement of productive resources within these countries.
It has often been remarked that international economics and public ﬁnance
share many of the same analytical tools and traditions. In particular, both
have made extensive use of general equilibrium theory, including the two-sector
general equilibrium model (see, e.g., Jones (1965), Johnson (1971), Harberger
(1962)), to understand the allocative and distributional eﬀects of public policies.
In international economics, the classic problem of public policy is to analyze the
eﬃciency and distributional consequences of changes in tariﬀs; customarily, this
problem is investigated under the assumption that “domestic” economic policy
consists of little more than a mechanism for lump-sum distribution of tariﬀ
revenues to residents. In public ﬁnance, classic problems include the analysis of
the eﬃciency and distributional consequences of taxes on some or all factors of
production employed in some or all sectors of the economy; customarily, these
problems are investigated under the assumption that the economy is entirely
isolated from the rest of the world, both with respect to trade in goods and
28services and with respect to movement of factors of production.
For much of the postwar period, this arrangement has facilitated a productive
intellectual division of labor – one, however, which deprecates the analysis of the
issues discussed here. However justiﬁed these modeling traditions may have been
in the past, it is highly appropriate to reexamine their underlying assumptions
during periods of signiﬁcant institutional change, such as the increased impetus
toward economic integration in the EU and the economic and political changes
that have occurred in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, including
German uniﬁcation, since the collapse of the Soviet regime.
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34TABLE 1
International Migration Rates, Selected OECD Countries
Selected Years, 1988--2000
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Australia
Inflow 0.61% 0.96% 1.03% 1.17% 1.25% 1.25% 1.33% 1.47% 1.65%
Outflow 0.28% 0.25% 0.24% 0.24% 0.25% 0.25% 0.26% 0.25% 0.27%
Gross/Net 2.66 1.72 1.61 1.53 1.49 1.50 1.49 1.41 1.38
Gross  0.89% 1.21% 1.28% 1.41% 1.50% 1.51% 1.60% 1.72% 1.92%
Austria
Inflow 0.73% 0.89% 0.81%
Outflow 0.55% 0.58% 0.55%
Gross/Net 7.28 4.77 5.11
Gross  1.29% 1.48% 1.36%
Belgium
Inflow 0.39% 0.44% 0.51% 0.54% 0.55% 0.53% 0.55% 0.52% 0.51% 0.48% 0.50% 0.67% 0.67%
Outflow 0.33% 0.28% 0.27% 0.35% 0.28% 0.31% 0.34% 0.33% 0.32% 0.34% 0.36% 0.36% 0.35%
Gross/Net 11.9 4.4 3.3 4.8 3.1 3.9 4.1 4.3 4.3 5.7 6.0 3.3 3.2
Gross  0.71% 0.71% 0.78% 0.89% 0.83% 0.83% 0.89% 0.85% 0.83% 0.82% 0.85% 1.03% 1.02%
Denmark
Inflow 0.27% 0.29% 0.29% 0.34% 0.33% 0.30% 0.25% 0.25% 0.24% 0.23% 0.23% 0.28%
Outflow 0.10% 0.09% 0.09% 0.10% 0.09% 0.09% 0.10% 0.10% 0.11% 0.13% 0.15% 0.15%
Gross/Net 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.3 2.3 2.8 3.4 4.3 3.4
Gross  0.37% 0.39% 0.38% 0.44% 0.42% 0.39% 0.34% 0.35% 0.36% 0.36% 0.38% 0.44%
Finland
Inflow 0.08% 0.13% 0.25% 0.21% 0.22% 0.15% 0.14% 0.15% 0.16% 0.16% 0.15% 0.18%
Outflow 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.06% 0.03% 0.03% 0.04% 0.08%
Gross/Net 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.5 2.3 1.5 1.5 1.7 2.6
Gross  0.10% 0.15% 0.27% 0.24% 0.24% 0.18% 0.17% 0.21% 0.19% 0.19% 0.19% 0.26%
Germany
Inflow 0.83% 0.98% 1.06% 1.15% 1.50% 1.22% 0.95% 0.97% 0.86% 0.75% 0.74% 0.82% 0.79%
Outflow 0.46% 0.56% 0.59% 0.62% 0.76% 0.88% 0.76% 0.69% 0.68% 0.78% 0.78% 0.68% 0.68%
Gross/Net 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.1 6.1 9.2 5.9 8.5 -57.4 -37.1 10.4 14.0
Gross  1.29% 1.54% 1.65% 1.77% 2.26% 2.09% 1.71% 1.65% 1.55% 1.53% 1.52% 1.50% 1.47%
Hungary
Inflow 0.22% 0.15% 0.16% 0.12% 0.13% 0.12% 0.12% 0.12% 0.15%
Outflow 0.06% 0.06% 0.05% 0.05% 0.04% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06%
Gross/Net 1.7 2.2 1.9 2.3 2.0 2.6 3.0 3.0 2.4
Gross  0.28% 0.20% 0.21% 0.17% 0.17% 0.18% 0.18% 0.18% 0.21%TABLE 1 (Cont.)
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Luxembourg
Inflow 2.19% 2.23% 2.44% 2.59% 2.50% 2.32% 2.28% 2.34% 2.21% 2.23% 2.49% 2.73% 2.47%
Outflow 1.41% 1.46% 1.44% 1.53% 1.43% 1.26% 1.31% 1.20% 1.35% 1.38% 1.57% 1.60% 1.62%
Gross/Net 4.7 4.8 3.9 3.9 3.7 3.4 3.7 3.1 4.1 4.2 4.4 3.8 4.8
Gross  3.60% 3.69% 3.88% 4.12% 3.94% 3.57% 3.59% 3.54% 3.56% 3.61% 4.06% 4.33% 4.09%
Netherlands
Inflow 0.39% 0.44% 0.54% 0.56% 0.55% 0.57% 0.44% 0.43% 0.50% 0.49% 0.52% 0.50% 0.58%
Outflow 0.14% 0.14% 0.14% 0.14% 0.15% 0.15% 0.15% 0.14% 0.14% 0.14% 0.14% 0.13% 0.13%
Gross/Net 2.2 2.0 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.7 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6
Gross  0.54% 0.59% 0.68% 0.70% 0.70% 0.72% 0.59% 0.57% 0.64% 0.63% 0.66% 0.63% 0.71%
Norway
Inflow 0.55% 0.44% 0.37% 0.38% 0.40% 0.52% 0.41% 0.38% 0.39% 0.50% 0.60% 0.72% 0.62%
Outflow 0.22% 0.25% 0.23% 0.20% 0.19% 0.24% 0.22% 0.21% 0.23% 0.23% 0.27% 0.28% 0.33%
Gross/Net 2.3 3.7 4.3 3.2 2.8 2.8 3.3 3.4 3.8 2.7 2.6 2.3 3.3
Gross  0.77% 0.69% 0.60% 0.57% 0.59% 0.76% 0.63% 0.58% 0.62% 0.73% 0.87% 1.01% 0.95%
Sweden
Inflow 0.53% 0.69% 0.62% 0.51% 0.46% 0.63% 0.85% 0.41% 0.33% 0.38% 0.40% 0.39% 0.38%
Outflow 0.14% 0.15% 0.19% 0.17% 0.15% 0.17% 0.18% 0.17% 0.16% 0.17% 0.16% 0.15% 0.14%
Gross/Net 1.7 1.6 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.7 1.5 2.5 3.0 2.7 2.3 2.3 2.1
Gross  0.67% 0.85% 0.81% 0.68% 0.61% 0.80% 1.03% 0.58% 0.49% 0.55% 0.56% 0.54% 0.52%
Switzerland
Inflow 1.13% 1.19% 1.48% 1.59% 1.60% 1.47% 1.29% 1.23% 1.03% 1.01% 1.04% 1.18% 1.20%
Outflow 0.83% 0.85% 0.87% 0.96% 1.15% 1.01% 0.90% 0.94% 0.94% 0.88% 0.82% 0.80% 0.77%
Gross/Net 6.5 6.0 3.9 4.1 6.1 5.3 5.7 7.6 21.5 14.5 8.4 5.2 4.5
Gross  1.97% 2.04% 2.35% 2.55% 2.75% 2.48% 2.19% 2.17% 1.97% 1.89% 1.85% 1.99% 1.97%
Source: Inflows and outflows: OECD (1999a), Table A.1.1 (for 1988-1990 data); OECD(2003), Tables A.1.1, A.1.2. Population: US Bureau of the Census, International Data Base.
Note: Data shown only for years in which both inflows and outflows are available.TABLE 2
Stocks of Foreign-Born Population, Selected OECD Countries
 As Percentage of Total
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Australia 22.9 23.0 22.9 22.9 23.0 23.3 23.3 23.3 23.3 23.6
Austria 11.1 10.8 10.4
Canada 16.1 17.4
Denmark 4.0 4.1 4.3 4.7 4.9 5.2 5.4 5.6 5.8
Finland 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6
France 10.0
Hungary 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9
Mexico 0.5
Netherlands 8.1 9.0 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.4 9.6 9.8 10.1
New Zealand 19.5
Norway 4.6 5.0 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.8 6.1 6.5 6.8
Sweden 9.6 9.9 10.5 10.5 11.0 11.0 10.8 11.8 11.3
US 7.9 8.7 8.8 9.4 9.7 9.8 10.3 10.4
Source: OECD (1999a), Table A.1.5 (1990 data); OECD (2003), Table A.1.4.TABLE 3
Stocks of Foreign Population, Selected OECD Countries, 
As Percentage of Total
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Austria 4.5 5.1 5.9 6.8 7.9 8.6 8.9 9.0 9.0 9.1 9.1 9.2 9.3
Belgium 8.8 8.9 9.1 9.2 9.0 9.1 9.1 9.0 9.0 8.9 8.7 8.8 8.4
Czech Republic 0.4 0.8 1.0 1.5 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.0
Denmark 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.8 4.2 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.8
Finland 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8
France 6.3 5.6
Germany 7.3 7.7 8.4 7.3 8.0 8.5 8.6 8.8 8.9 9.0 8.9 8.9 8.9
Hungary 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 . 1.3 .
Ireland 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.2 3.3
Italy 1.1 0.9 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.7 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.4
Luxembourg 27.4 27.9 29.4 30.2 31.0 31.8 32.6 33.4 34.1 34.9 35.6 36.0 37.3
Netherlands 4.2 4.3 4.6 4.8 5.0 5.1 5.0 4.7 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.2
Norway 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.7 4.0 4.1
Portugal 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.1
Spain 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2
Sweden 5.0 5.3 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.8 6.1 5.2 6.0 6.0 5.6 5.5 5.4
Switzerland 15.2 15.6 16.3 17.1 17.6 18.1 18.6 18.9 18.9 19.0 19.0 19.2 19.3
UK 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.4 3.4 3.6 3.8 3.8 4.0
Source: OECD (1999a), Table A.1.6 (1990 data); OECD (2003), Table A.1.5.Table 4





















Source: Dang et al. (2001).TABLE 5
Migration Rates in the United States, 1980--2000
Selected Years
Mobility period and type Northeast  Midwest  South  West
1999-2000
Inmigrants.............................. 0.68% 1.12% 1.26% 1.21%
Outmigrants............................. 1.15% 0.99% 1.03% 1.30%
Net internal migration................ -0.47% 0.13% 0.23% -0.09%
Movers from abroad...................... 0.54% 0.37% 0.61% 0.96%
Net migration (including abroad)...... 0.07% 0.50% 0.84% 0.87%
Gross Internal Migration Rate 1.82% 2.12% 2.28% 2.50%
Gross/Net Internal Migration Rate -3.88 16.61 10.08 -27.77
1989-90
Inmigrants.............................. 0.91% 1.52% 1.67% 1.83%
Outmigrants............................. 1.49% 1.72% 1.40% 1.48%
Net internal migration................ -0.58% -0.19% 0.27% 0.35%
Movers from abroad...................... 0.65% 0.28% 0.59% 1.06%
Net migration (including abroad)...... 0.06% 0.09% 0.85% 1.41%
Gross Internal Migration Rate 2.40% 3.24% 3.07% 3.31%
Gross/Net Internal Migration Rate -4.10 -16.66 11.42 9.54
1980-81
Inmigrants.............................. 0.94% 1.10% 1.83% 2.02%
Outmigrants............................. 1.44% 1.79% 1.18% 1.64%
Net internal migration................ -0.49% -0.69% 0.65% 0.37%
Movers from abroad...................... 0.42% 0.31% 0.55% 1.19%
Net migration (including abroad)...... -0.07% -0.38% 1.19% 1.56%
Gross Internal Migration Rate 2.38% 2.90% 3.01% 3.66%
Gross/Net Internal Migration Rate -4.83 -4.20 4.66 9.82
Source: Wildasin (2003); derived from US Bureau of the Census.  All figures in thousands. TABLE 6
 Mobility Status of Canadian Population, 1996 
( Percentage, by Place of Residence 1 Year Ago)
For Canada, Provinces, and Territories
Canada Newfdld. PEI Nova New Quebec Ontario
Scotia Brunswick
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
    External migrants 0.8% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.5% 1.0%
      Interprovincial migrants 1.0% 1.3% 2.6% 1.9% 1.8% 0.4% 0.6%
      Intraprovincial migrants 4.6% 3.4% 2.9% 3.2% 3.4% 5.1% 4.6%
  Non-migrants  9.0% 6.0% 6.8% 8.8% 7.7% 7.7% 8.5%
Non-movers  84.5% 89.1% 87.5% 85.8% 86.9% 86.3% 85.3%
Manitoba Sask. Alberta British Yukon
Columbia NW Terr.
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
    External migrants 0.5% 0.4% 0.7% 1.5% 0.6% 0.2%
      Interprovincial migrants 1.4% 1.9% 2.1% 1.8% 7.8% 5.0%
      Intraprovincial migrants 2.8% 4.2% 4.3% 5.4% 2.5% 4.3%
  Non-migrants  10.0% 9.4% 11.8% 11.2% 13.6% 17.2%
Non-movers  85.2% 84.2% 81.2% 80.2% 75.6% 73.3%
Source: Wildasin (2003), derived from Statistics Canada data.TABLE 6 (Cont.)
Population 1 Year and Over, Showing Mobility Status, 
(Percentage, by Place of Residence 1 Year Ago)
For Canada, Provinces, and Territories
Ontario Sask. Alberta British Yukon
Columbia
100.0% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
1.0%     External migrants 0.4% 0.7% 1.5% 0.6%
0.6%       Interprovincial migrants 1.9% 2.1% 1.8% 7.8%
4.6%       Intraprovincial migrants 4.2% 4.3% 5.4% 2.5%
8.5%   Non-migrants  9.4% 11.8% 11.2% 13.6%
85.3% Non-movers  84.2% 81.2% 80.2% 75.6%TABLE 7
Tax Stuctures, OECD Countries, 1965—2002
Percentage Shares, Selected Years
1965 1975 1985 1995 1997 2002
Personal Income Tax 26 30 30 27 27 26
Corporation Income Tax 988889
Social Security Contributions 18 22 22 25 25 25
Property Taxes 865556
General Consumption Taxes 12 13 16 18 18 19
Specific Consumption Taxes 24 18 16 13 13 11
Other 333443
Source: OECD (2004a), Table C (1999 ed. For 1997 data).TABLE 8
Social Expenditures as Share of GDP, Selected OECD Countries
Selected Years, 1980—2001
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001
Australia 11.3 13.5 14.2 17.8 18.6 18.0
Austria 22.5 24.1 24.1 26.6 26.0 26.0
Belgium 24.1 26.9 26.9 28.1 26.7 27.2
Denmark 29.1 27.9 29.3 32.4 28.9 29.2
Finland 18.5 23.0 24.8 31.1 24.5 24.8
France 21.1 26.6 26.6 29.2 28.3 28.5
Germany 23.0 23.6 22.8 27.5 27.2 27.4
Greece 11.5 17.9 20.9 21.4 23.6 24.3
Ireland 17.0 22.2 18.6 19.4 13.6 13.8
Italy 18.4 21.3 23.3 23.0 24.1 24.4
Luxembourg 23.5 23.0 21.9 23.8 20.0 20.8
The Netherlands 26.9 27.3 27.6 25.6 21.8 21.8
Norway 17.9 19.1 24.7 26.0 23.0 23.9
Portugal 10.9 11.1 13.9 18.0 20.5 21.1
Spain 15.9 18.2 19.5 21.4 19.9 19.6
Sweden 28.8 30.0 30.8 33.0 28.6 28.9
Switzerland 14.2 15.1 17.9 23.9 25.4 26.4
United Kingdom 17.9 21.1 19.5 23.0 21.7 21.8
United States 13.3 13.0 13.4 15.5 14.2 14.8
Unweighted Average 19.3 21.3 22.1 24.6 23.0 23.3
Source: OECD (2004b).TABLE 9




All Tax Returns 130,076,443     $6,033,585,532 $834,915,128 $6,419
13.84%
1,908,466     $548,814,753 $129,600,389 $67,908 23.61%
1.47% 9.10% 15.52%
336,684     $227,044,247 $64,681,440 $192,113 28.49%
0.26% 3.76% 7.75%
168,977     $475,832,545 $137,257,697 $812,286 28.85%
0.13% 7.89% 16.44%
All taxpayers 
$200,000 or more 1.86% 20.75% 39.71% $137,333
Source: US Department of the Treasury (2004).  Aggregate dollar amounts in thousands.
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